Biased probing of memory:  A new explanation of hindsight bias. by Ogden, Eve Elaine.
Ur4IT/E%RI3ITTf OI? 
<]HRAJ[)lJVnriC
BIASED PROBING OF MEMORY: A NEW EXPLANATION OF
HINDSIGHT BIAS
A Dissertation 
SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY 









The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy 
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and 
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper 
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized 
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI Microform 3117198 
Copyright 2004 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company 
300 North Zeeb Road 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Copyright by Eve Elaine Ogden 2003 
All Rights Reserved
BIASED PROBING OF MEMORY: A NEW EXPLANATION OF
HINDSIGHT BIAS
A Dissertation APPROVED FOR THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY








larlys Gasc^o Lipe y
Acknowledgments
Various people have contributed to this study with 
suggestions, guidance and assistance. For their help I would like 
to thank the following people:
Dr. Scott Gronlund, Professor, Department of Psychology, 
University of Oklahoma, for suggestions regarding the study and 
for many helpful suggestions and criticisms regarding the 
construction of this dissertation.
Dr. Joseph Rodgers, Professor, Department of Psychology, 
University of Oklahoma, for critically reading the manuscript.
Dr. Robert Terry, Associate Professor, Department of 
Psychology, University of Oklahoma, for critically reading the 
manuscript.
Dr. Robert Hamm, Director, Clinical Decision Making 
Program and Associate Professor, Department of Family and 
Preventative Medicine, University of Oklahoma Health Science 
Center for critically reading the manuscript.
Dr. Marly8 Gascho Lipe, Chair and Professor, Department of 
Accounting, for critically reading the manuscript.
IV
Special thanks are due to Dr. Charles Gettys, Professor 
Em eritus, Department of Psychology, University of Oklahoma, for 
suggesting the study, for his active interest in my academic and 
scientific development, and for his lively discussions. He was my 
greatest teacher, my mentor and my friend. He is missed eveiy 
time I "think great thoughts."
Special thanks are due to my husband, Michael, for his 
positive attitude and encouragement throughout my studies. 
Without him, the completion of this research and dissertation 
would no t have occurred.
V
Table of Contents
P ^ e s
Acknowledgements............................................................................. iv
List of Tables..................................................................................... viii
List of Illustrations............................................................................. ix
A bstract................................................................................................. x
Introduction........................................................................................  1
Possible Explanations...................................................................  4
Motivational Factors.................................................................. 4
Cognitive Factors........................................................................ 5
Specificity of the Probe .................................................................... 12
Description of MINERVA-DM...........................................................14
Level of Detail in the Probe.....................................................17
Purpose of Current Research.......................................................... 20
Experiment 1 ..................................................................................... 20
M ethods...................................................   23
Results...................................................................................... 27
D iscussion................................................................................31





General D iscussion........................................................................... 51
Factors th a t Contribute D etails........................................... 53
Alternative Explanations....................................................... 55
More Alternatives versus a  More Detailed Alternative ...58
Conclusion................................................................................59
References........................................................................................... 61
Appendix A: MINERVA-DM Simulation Program ........................ 71




1 Sum m aiy of Possible Scenario Pairings ............................ 136
2 Summary of Frequency Data for Hindsight Condition.... 139
3 Examples of Statements from Memory T est...................... 143
4 Comparison of Mean Sub-test Scores.................................145




1 Ebcample of Vector Representation in Memory................... 133
2 MINERVA-DM Hindsight Bias Simulations........................ 134
3 Example of a  Vignette and Possible Outcomes.................. 135
4 Actual O utcom es.....................................................................137
5 Alternative Outcomes..............................................................138
6 MINERVA-DM Comparison to Experiment 1......................140
7 Effect of Time on Hindsight B ia s .......................................... 141
8 Differential Forgetting Predictions........................................142
9 Likelihood Judgm ents Over Tim e......................................... 144
10 Differential Forgetting for True Statem ents........................ 146
11 Revisiting Proportions............................................................. 148
12 MINERVA-DM Comparison to Experiment 2 ...................... 149
IX
Abstract
The following research explores how biased probing of 
memoiy leads to overestimating the accuracy with which one could 
have predicted past events, the hindsight bias. MINERVA-DM, a 
multiple trace model developed by Dougherty, Gettys, and Ogden 
(1999), suggests that the probing of memory with detailed versus 
sketchy probes leads to a  hindsight bias. When making probability 
judgm ents concerning an event tha t has already occurred we tend 
to probe memory with a highly detailed probe. We use sketchy 
probes for alternative events tha t might have happened b u t did 
not. This asymmetry in the am ount of detail in the probes leads to 
an excessive feeling of certainty for what actually happened, and 
reduces the feelings of certainty for alternative outcomes.
Two experiments were conducted examining the effects of 
biased probing on the hindsight bias. Experiment 1 systematically 
varied the am ount of detail used to probe memory. It was found 
tha t the more detailed outcome knowledge was, the more excessive 
the bias. Experiment 2 examined what participants forgot about a 
sporting event, and how forgetting affected the hindsight bias.
Participants forgot more details of outcomes for "what might have 
happened, bu t did not." This differential forgetting created the 




Individuals often overestimate the accuracy with which they 
could have predicted past events -  viewing what has already 
happened as relatively inevitable and obvious. For example, a 
researcher may regard the findings of h is/her research as having 
been predictable all along. If asked to estimate retrospectively how 
likely the results were to occur, he / she often assigns higher 
probabilities than would another person predicting the same 
experimental outcome in advance. This propensity to distort one's 
judgm ent retrospectively in the direction of outcome information is 
called the hindsight bias or the "knew-it-all-along" effect.
Fischhoff (1975) conducted one of the first studies on the 
hindsight bias. He provided participants with vignettes describing 
either a  historical or clinical event (e.g., one vignette described war 
between the British and the Gurkas of Nepal). The last sentence in 
the vignette described a possible outcome to the war, and 
participants were led to believe it was the actual outcome. After 
reading the vignette, they were asked to estimate the likelihood of 
four possible outcomes, one of which was the last sentence in the
vignette. Fischhoff found participants tended to rate the outcome 
they believed had occurred as having been more likely than  the 
alternatives tha t they thought did not occur.
This bias affects everyday people in a wide variety of 
situations. Doctors, lawyers, and managers have been shown to 
over-estimate the predictability of an event based upon 
retrospective knowledge. For example, the hindsight bias has been 
found to affect judgm ents concerning elections (e.g.,Dietrich & 
Olson, 1993; Leary, 1982; Synodinos, 1986), medical diagnoses 
(Arkes, Woitmann, SaviUe, & Harkness, 1986), and pregnancy 
tests (Pennington, Rutter, McKenna, & Morley, 1980) as well as 
many other areas. Furthermore, the hindsight bias has been used 
to explain individuals' perceptions of historical events, such as the 
Clinton impeachment verdict (Bryant & Guilbault, 2002), the O.J. 
Simpson trail (Demakis, 1997, Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire, 2000), 
the Rodney King incident (Gilbertson, Dietrich, Olson, & Guenther, 
1994), and the nuclear accident a t Chernobyl (Verplanken & 
Pieters, 1988).
Understanding this bias is of practical importance because it 
can lead to significant consequences. Without realizing th a t
retrospective knowledge influences judgment, a  person may be 
prone to believing tha t h is/her opinions are more accurate than  
they really are, thus becoming overconfident. Also, it may lead an 
individual to devalue the opinions of others who did not predict the 
event, an d /o r to overvalue the opinions of those who did. 
Furthermore, the hindsight bias may cause a failure to properly 
update one's knowledge, and could lead to failure to recognize the 
need to improve one's judgments.
The hindsight bias is a  robust effect. It has been shown to 
be unaffected by telling people to work harder (Fischhoff, 1977), or 
by manipulating the individual's perspective (i.e., making 
judgm ents as others would; Wood, 1978). Even awareness of the 
bias does not affect its existence (Fischhoff, 1977). For example, 
Bond-Raacke et al. (2001) used subjects from a  psychology class 
tha t had previously studied the hindsight bias. The subjects' 
awareness of bias did not prevent them from committing it. 
Because of its tenacity there is a need to develop an understanding 
of the processes involved in this bias, and to what extent they 
modulate its magnitude.
Possible explanations
Explanations of processes underlying the hindsight bias are 
divided in to  two basic categories: motivational factors (i.e., self- 
flattery or desire to appear intelligent) and cognitive factors. See 
Hawkins and Hastie (1990) and Christensen-Szalanski and 
Willham (1991) for in-depth reviews of these explanations.
Motivational factors.
Individuals may be motivated to look good (i.e., appear 
intelligent and knowledgeable). Persons may employ strategies 
tha t bias their judgments in such a  way that they appear to make 
better predictions than if asked to do so in advance. Most 
researchers consider the effects of motivational factors to be 
relatively small because the hindsight effect is so robust (Connolly 
& Bukszar, 1990; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Leary, 1981, 1982; 
Wood, 1978).
Campbell and Tesser (1983) investigated the influence of the 
predictability motive (the desire to know and be able to predict the 
environment accurately) and the self-presentation motive (a need 
to maintain private and public esteem) on the hindsight bias.
While they did find tha t motivational factors were significantly 
correlated with the degree of bias, these factors could only account 
for 6% of the variance in the bias. In other research, Leary (1981, 
1982) found no e% ct of a high or low ego-involvement in non- 
laboratoiy settings. Synodinos (1986) found tha t individual 
differences in self-esteem and political involvement did not play a 
role in hindsight.
At best motivational factors play a role in modulating the 
magnitude of the bias. They have not been shown to eliminate or 
produce it (i.e., providing incentives does not eliminate the bias). 
Thus, motivational factors have a very limited impact on 
judgments.
Cognitive Factors.
Most researchers have concluded tha t cognitive factors play 
a greater role in the hindsight phenomenon. Current thinking 
hypothesizes tha t the hindsight bias is simply a natural by-product 
of the normal process by which information is integrated, stored 
and /o r retrieved from memory (Connolly & Bukszar, 1990; 
Dougherty, Gettys & Ogden, 1999). However, to date there have
been relatively few studies attempting to isolate these cognitive 
processes (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Christensen-Szalanski & 
Willham, 1991). Cognitive factors tha t have been examined 
include: direct recall, anchoring and adjustment, memoiy 
impairment, and reconstruction. These will briefly be discussed in 
the following section.
TZecai/. One explanation is tha t individuals may 
directly recall old beliefs (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). For example, 
an individual may search h is /h er memory and respond 
consistently with h is/her original rating. This is an issue for 
studies tha t use a methodology (Werth, Strack, &
Forester, 2002). Using this methodology, participants are asked to 
recall subjective likelihood judgm ents tha t they made earlier after 
exposure to outcome knowledge or feedback. In other words, 
participants are asked to make the same judgm ent twice. Memoiy 
designs tend to produce smaller hindsight bias effects, because 
participants have the possibility of recalling their earlier estimates. 
However, while the results are smaller, participants do consistently 
produce a bias.
While direct recall may be a possibility, Hell, Gigerenzer, 
Gauggel, Mall, and MneHer (1988) found tha t in order for the 
hindsight bias to occur participants m ust forget their original 
estimation. Instead, it appears that deeper encoding for the 
original estimate leads to a decrease in the bias. In fact, Greyer 
and Ross (1993) found that greater cognitive effort enhanced 
participants' memoiy for the previous decisions, and thus 
decreased the bias.
an if vliÿua^nzen^. Another explanation involves 
anchoring and adjustm ent based on outcome knowledge 
(Fischhoff, 1977; Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). This explanation 
assum es participants anchor on 100% certainty after being told 
th a t a  particular outcome has occurred, and then adjust their 
certainty downward towards their retrospective judgment.
This explanation, however, does not work well. As with 
direct recall, participants m ust be able to recall previous 
judgm ents in order to adjust. And as was mentioned earlier, the 
recall of an original response actually decreases the bias (Greyer & 
Ross, 1993; Hell et al., 1988). Furthermore, individuals do not 
appear to anchor and adjust the alternative outcomes (those
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events th a t could have happened, bu t did not). Biases for 
alternative outcomes are much smaller and closer to participants' 
original estimates than biases for outcomes tha t "actually 
occurred" (Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; Woods,
1978). In other words, people are less likely to ac^ust their 
judgm ents when told an event did not occur.
Afemory Several memory-based approaches
imply tha t the hindsight bias is the result of retrieving a memory 
trace tha t has been changed or altered after the outcome 
knowledge (actual value) has been encoded (Fischhoff, 1975;
Loftus, 1975). In the past, it has been thought tha t an event is 
stored in a single memoiy trace and tha t new information is 
assimilated into the old trace. Fischhoff (1975, 1977), postulated 
tha t outcome knowledge is immediately assimilated into what is 
already known about the event, and tha t no trace of the original 
information is left in memoiy. This process occurs automatically 
as an individual attem pts to make sense of all relevant information 
concerning an event.
Therefore, the memoiy impairment explanation implies 
storage of a  faulty memoiy trace. An individual only stores a single
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version of the event in memory (Loftus & Loftus, 1980), and the 
process of updating and erasing causes this memory trace to be 
faulty. Thus, the hindsight bias results from the retrieval of a 
faulty (altered) memory trace from LTM.
Finally, participants may use rejudgment or 
reconstruction of the outcome. Here participants reconstruct prior 
judgm ents using their outcome knowledge as retrieval cues 
(Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Stahlberg 
& Maas, 1998; Schwartz & Stahlberg, 2003; Werth, Strack, & 
Forster, 2002). This explanation involves primarily three steps. 
First, an  individual searches LTM for evidence relevant to the task. 
Evidence tha t does not fit the outcome that has occurred becomes 
less accessible and is not retrieved. Second, the evidence is 
evaluated for arguments for and against the outcome happening. 
These arguments and the outcome that actually happened are 
assimilated into memoiy forming links to casual relations within 
the individual's knowledge structure. Third, the evidence is 
weighted and combined to produce an overall judgm ent (Hawkins 
& Hastie, 1990).
According to this approach, outcome knowledge is u sed  to 
reconstruct the "origineil judgment^ (Schwartz & Stahlberg, 2003). 
The original information is not lost, erased nor rendered 
inaccessible by the outcome knowledge (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985). For example, Schwartz and Stahlberg (2003) dem onstrated 
tha t the outcome information had no effect on individual's ability 
to recall their initial judgment. Instead, either the original 
information, or the outcome knowledge could be used to make the 
judgm ents.
The debate between memory impairment and reconstruction 
is similar to the one between Loftus (1975, 1979) and McCloskey & 
Zaragoza (1985) within the field of eyewitness testimony. Loftus 
(1975; 1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980) believed tha t the misleading 
information effect was due to the misleading information 
overwriting (or replacing) the original information in memory. The 
original information was automatically updated when subsequent 
misleading information was encountered (destructive updating). 
Thus, the original information was lost forever and could not be 
retrieved. On the other hand, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) felt 
tha t the original information was neither lost nor rendered
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inaccessible. Instead, the misleading information effect occurs 
when outcome knowledge is used to reconstruct the original event. 
The origirial information, outcome knowledge or both could be 
used during this reconstruction process.
In summary, the first three explanations (motivation, direct 
recall, an d  anchoring and ac^ustment) do not work well. In fact, 
previous research has either eliminated them as explanations for 
the hindsight bias or shown them to be only mitigating factors 
(affecting the magnitude of the bias). Current research, however, 
has been unable to eliminate either the memoiy impairment or the 
reconstruction approach (Stahlberg and Maass, 1998; Pohl, 
Eisenhauer, & Hardt, 2003; Schwartz and Stahlberg, 2003). 
PXirther, it has been concluded tha t memoiy impairment and 
biased reconstruction are not mutually exclusive, and tha t both 
may lead to the hindsight bias.
Specificity of the Probe
Dougherty, Gettys and Ogden (1999) derived an alternative 
explanation for the hindsight bias using the global memory 
matching model, MINERVA-DM. Their explanation involves a
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biased probing of memoiy that results from the use of a highly- 
detailed memoiy probe. This explanation may provide a 
mechanism for the first step in the reconstruction explanation in 
which an  individual searches LTM for evidence tha t is relevant to 
the task.
The new explanation proposes tha t an individual does not 
ju st search LTM, but instead uses probes that vaiy in the am ount 
of detail to conduct the search. The idea is that the details in the 
probes are brought into working memoiy via the decision task 
itself, retrieval from LTM, or internal generation. The probe for 
"what actually occurred" is highly detailed because the actual 
outcome-scenario is used as the retrieval cue. Memories for real 
events tend to contain more sensoiy, spatial, temporal, and 
affective information, compared to those tha t have been internally 
generated (Johnson & Raye, 1981). The probes for alternative 
outcomes tha t "might have happened, bu t did not" are m uch less 
detailed. These probes rely heavily on an internal scenario- 
generation process, which is assum ed to produce less detail.
Probing LTM with a very detailed probe would m atch more 
traces (a larger subset of memory) than  a less detailed probe. This
12
would resu lt in an inflated level of certainty; thus, producing the 
hindsight bias. This explanation asserts tha t an asymmetry in the 
am ount of details contained in the probes leads to an excessive 
feeling of certainty for what actuaDy happened, and reduced 
feelings of certa in^  for what might have happened but did not.
Exaggerating this problem is the possibility tha t a 
disproportionate am ount of details are forgotten over time for the 
alternative outcomes (differential forgetting). Details for the 
alternative hypotheses may be forgotten at a much higher rate 
than  details for what actually happened. Further, individuals may 
revisit memories for "what happened," thus reinstantiate these 
memories.
In summaiy, probes for "what actually happened" are more 
detailed because they are based on memories for real events, and 
they may be reinstantiated over time. Hence they are less likely to 
be forgotten. In contrast, probes for alternative outcomes are less 
detailed because they tend to be internally generated, and they 
may be forgotten at a higher rate over time.
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Description of MINERVA DM
This explanation arises from a quantitatively-specified 
memoiy model for decision making called MINERVA-decision 
making (DM). MINERVA-DM is a modified version of Hintzman's 
(1984; 1988, 1990) MINERVA2 memory model for frequency 
judgm ents and recognition memoiy. The following is a  brief 
description of MINERVA-DM. For a more detailed, computational 
explanation of the model refer to Dougherty, Gettys, and Ogden 
(1999). Also, refer to Appendix A for the source codes to a 
com puter program used simulate the model.
MINERVA-DM is a multiple-trace memoiy model tha t 
assum es stimuli are encoded into long-term memory (LTM), but 
specific traces are less than perfect replicas of stimuli. Each 
experienced event is encoded as a separate memory trace. 
MINERVA-DM represents traces in memory as vectors made up  of 
a  series of +1, -1, or O's. Zeros correspond to a  feature th a t is 
either unknown or irrelevant. The value -1 corresponds to a 
feature that is inhibitory, and the value +1 corresponds to a 
feature that is excitatory.
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A learning (L) parameter is used to determine the degree to 
which traces encoded into memoiy are exact replicas of the event 
vectors. Each feature in an event vector is copied into LTM with 
probability L (0 < L < 1). This allows traces to match the original 
events to varying degrees. It also means multiple traces of a 
repeated item may not be stored in exactly the same manner. L is 
affected by length of exposure, num ber of exposures, attention, 
perceptual acuity, and so on.
Memory is assessed by using a memory probe, a retrieval 
cue which specifies which type of information is to be retrieved 
from memoiy. The MINERVA-DM probe is also a vector of +1, -1, 
and O's. All traces in LTM are activated simultaneously by the 
probe. The similarity, 8, between the probe and each trace, i, in 
memory is assessed.
( 1 )
1^  corresponds to feature j  in the probe, Ty corresponds to 
feature in trace r, and is the num ber of corresponding nonzero 
features in both the probe and the trace i. Thus, if either one or
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both or Tij) is nonzero, the iV; is incremented. If either I  ^or Tij 
is zero, the product will be zero and nothing will be added to the 
num erator of Equation 1. Zeros in the vectors tend to reduce 
similarity. Thus, similarity can have a negative or positive value.
The activation of a single memoiy trace is the simularily 
cubed:
(2)
This cubing function allows traces that are highly similar to the 
probe to dominate by giving them more weight than traces tha t are 
only somewhat similar. Further, the sign of activation is 
preserved.
The output of the model, echo intensity, is the sum  of the 
activations (cubed similarities) over all traces in LTM.
7 = ]^ ^  = ^5 '^ (3)
/=!
M is the num ber of traces assessed for similarity. E)cho 
intensity is proportional to judged likelihood. It increases as the 
frequency of similar traces stored in memory increases.
To recap, if an individual is asked to assess the likelihood of 
an event occurring (i.e., the sinking of the Titanic), h e /sh e  m ust
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create a t least two probes (the Titanic sank versus the Titanic 
stayed afloat). Then the probes are used one a t a  time to evaluate 
LTM. The similarity between each probe and each trace is 
assessed. For each probe, the sum  of the cubed similarities (echo 
intensity) over all LTM traces is calculated. Echo intensity for 
each scenario is then used to make estimates of likelihood.
.Leve/ in  As mentioned above, level of
detail in the memoiy probes is important to MINERVA-DM's 
explanation of the hindsight bias. This explanation specifies tha t 
the level of detail of a probe is greater for the event th a t is said to 
have ''actually happened." The probes for alternative outcomes are 
less detailed.
MINERVA-DM specifies the am ount of detail by a  G 
parameter. This param eter can vary from 0 to 1.0. Each detail of 
the scenario is copied to the probe with a probability of 1 -  G that 
it will be converted to a 0. If, for example, G = 1.0, all details of the 
scenario are retained in the probe and no features are converted to 
Os. Probing long-term memoiy with a  detailed cue returns a 
relatively large echo intensity. If, on the other hand, G = 0.5, then 
half of the +1 and -I 's  in the probe vectors are converted to O's.
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This would reduce the similarity between the probe and the traces 
in memoiy and therefore reduce echo intensity (refer to Figure 1).
It is assum ed tha t the probe for "what did happened" is highly 
detailed and the probe for "what might have happened bu t didn't" 
(the alternative outcome) is less detailed. The G param eter is used 
to vaiy the am ount of details in the probe and thus, simulate 
biased probing of LTM by degrading the memoiy probe.
According to MINERVA-DM, the biased probing of LTM with 
highly-detailed probes results in an elevated level of similarity, 
which in tu rn  results in an inflated level of certainty and a 
hindsight bias. It is believed tha t the probe for "what actually 
happened" is highly detailed because the actual outcome- scenario 
is used as the retrieval cue. The probes for "what might have 
happened bu t did not" are much less detailed because these 
probes rely on a scenario-generation process; the details m ust be 
generated internally and filled in by the individual.
There are several possibilities for why the probe for "what 
actually happened" is more detailed. First, it occurred recently, 
and has had little time to decay. Second, it was experienced rather 
than imagined, and thus, contains more information, compared to
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those th a t  have been internally generated (Johnson & Raye, 1981). 
Third is th e  possibility of differential forgetting -  over time, details 
for the alternative scenarios will fade faster than details for the 
actual scenario. Individuals may "revisit" the event in memoiy for 
what actually happened. For example, watching various 
docum entaries about the Titanic, reading books about it, 
discussing it, etc., allows a person to revisit details about how the 
Titanic sank. Fourth, few details are provided for the alternative 
outcomes, because they tend to be internally generated. For 
example, the media has provided a  plethora of details concerning 
the Titanic and why she may have sunk (design flaws, poor 
judgm ent by crew, pressure to break a speed record, massive 
death toll, an iceberg, and so on), and relatively few details for how 
she might have been saved.
Purpose of Current Research
The aim of the present research was to examine the biased 
probing of memory explanation, and to provide an empirical test of 
the MINERVA-DM model. The first experiment was based on a 
vignette paradigm, so comparisons could be made to past research.
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and 8 0  the  level of details in an outcome could be systematically 
manipulated. A second study was conducted using a  more "real 
world" task. Phrther, the second experiment examined the effect of 
differential forgetting on likelihood judgments. The results from 
both experiments were compared to simulations produced by 
MINERVA-DM.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to examine the effect of 
varying the level of detail in outcome knowledge. The use of 
vignettes, small literary sketches, is a typical methodology 
employed to study the hindsight bias. In past studies, the 
experimental task provided all retrieval cues to the participants 
and may have unwittingly biased the participants' memoiy probes 
by providing more detail for what actually happened. For example, 
FischhoS" (1975) had subjects read a short paragraph about the 
war between the British and the Gurkas of Nepal. The last 
sentence in the paragraph stated the outcome. Then subjects were 
asked to rate the likelihood of tha t outcome as well as three 
alternative outcomes (each only one sentence long). This may have
2 0
created an  asymmetry with which the subjects could probe their 
memories (a paragraph for the ''actual" outcome and a sentence for 
the alternatives).
Experiment 1 attempted to produce the biased probing effect 
using a  vignette paradigm. The level of detail was manipulated by 
varying the am ount of detail in the "actual" outcome and in a 
possible alternative outcome across several vignettes. MINERVA- 
DM predicts that the hindsight bias should be reduced as the level 
of details in the actual and alternative outcome approach each 
other. The hindsight bias should be the greatest when "actual" 
outcome is highly detailed and the alternative outcome is sketchy.
Two simulations were performed using MINERVA-DM. In 
the first simulation, G (a param eter tha t specifies the am ount of 
detail in the memory probes) was set to 0.4. This simulates a 
situation where the probe for the actual outcome scenario is highly 
detailed and the probe for what did not occur has relatively few 
details. In the second simulation, G was set to 0.8, and simulates 
situations where both probes (for what actually happened and for 
what did not) have relatively high levels of details. There were
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1000 sim ulated participants. The learning parameter was se t to 
0.75.
Figure 2 presents the results from the simulations. A.s can 
be seen, when G is set to 0.4 the magnitude of the hindsight bias 
is more pronounced. Thus, the hindsight bias should be m ost 
pronounced when participants use a veiy detailed probe for "what 
actually happened" and a sketchy probe for the alternative.
Also, this experiment tried to lessen or eliminate the 
hindsight bias. If increasing the level of detail in the "actual" 
outcome magnifies the hindsight bias, then increasing the level of 
detail in the alternative outcomes (the ones that might have 
happened but did not) may reduce or eliminate the bias.
Method
Participants (n = 206) were recruited from the 
psychology department's student subject pool a t the University of 
Oklahoma, and received course credit for participation. 
Participants were tested individually using a computer program. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental 
conditions: foresight (n = 92) and hindsight (n = 114) conditions.
2 2
Four vignettes were developed 
describing Gctional patients and their symptoms. The symptoms 
for each vignette were chosen because they equally conformed to 
either of two possible diagnoses (i.e., the patient could develop 
tuberculosis or Hodgkin's disease). The diagnosis descriptions 
were designed so tha t they were mutually exclusive.
For each diagnosis, two versions of the outcome were 
developed—one highly detailed, and one sketchy (see Figure 3).
This allowed the experimenter to systematically vary the am ount of 
detail in the "actual"^ and alternative^ outcome pairings, and for 
each possible comparison combination to be randomly generated. 
Outcome details consisted of various medical procedures used to 
form the diagnosis, medical regime used to treat the disease, 
outcome of treatment, and long-term prognosis for the patient.
The highly detailed version contained 44 + /- 3 unique concepts
1 The term "Actual" refers to the outcome participants are led to believe 
occurred (are told happened). It is  not a correct answer or a veridical 
probability.
2 3
(400 + /- 3 words) and the sketchy versions 12 +/- 1 concepts (50 
+ /- 2 words).
Vignettes and outcomes were selected on the basis of a 
norming study carried out on 23 participants. This norming study 
was conducted to select pairs of high detail outcomes and pairs of 
sketchy detail outcomes that were not significantly different from 
each other in likelihood judgments. No comparisons were made 
between high and low outcome pairings in the norming study. 
Participants read only the outcomes (no patient information, 
symptom, and so on), and they were not told which outcome was 
true. For the norming study, the mean likelihood judgm ent for 
high-detailed outcomes was M = 54.33, and for low-detailed 
outcomes M = 52.83. There was no statistically significant 
difference.
For each vignette, participants first read the 
patient and symptom description, and then they read the possible 
outcomes (one outcome for each diagnosis). Participants read one
2 The term "alternative" refers to the outcome that "might have happened, 
but did not."
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vignette for each of the possible detail-level combinations: 1) both 
outcomes were highly detailed (HH), 2) both outcomes were 
sketchy (LL) 3) the "actual" outcome was highly detailed and the 
alternative was sketchy (HL) and 4) the "actual" outcome was 
sketchy, and the alternative was highly detailed (LH). Thus, each 
participant read a total of four vignettes. Refer to Table 1 for a 
summary of the detail-level pairings.
The foresight group proceeded directly to making the 
likelihood judgm ents for each outcome, and was not told which 
outcome had occurred. The hindsight group read a brief statem ent 
telling which of the two outcomes "actually" occurred, and then 
made their likelihood judgments. Hindsight participants were 
asked to answer the likelihood judgm ents as they would have done 
in the absence of the outcome knowledge.
A computer program randomly administered the vignettes, 
detail level and order of their occurrence, and solicited the 
appropriate likelihood ratings. This was done to eliminate any 
order and vignette effects. Participants made likelihood judgm ents 
by sliding a cursor across a likelihood scale displayed on the 
computer. The scale ran from 0% to a  100%. Participants were
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told to move the cursor on the scale to indicate how likely they felt 
the outcom e was to have occurred. The experimental procedure 
was self-paced in that participants were given as much time as 
needed to  read the vignettes and to make the judgments. The 
entire experimental session lasted from 10 to 15 minutes.
Participant made two likelihood 
judgm ents for each detail-level scenario pairing (HH, LL, HL, and 
LH): one for the "actual" outcome, and one for the "alternative".
The am ount of time taken to read each outcome was measured.
Results
TYmea. A paired two-sample t-test found tha t the 
average am ount time spent reading high-detail outcomes M =
39.95 seconds, SD = 14.32) was statistically significantly different 
{t(205) = 8.59, p  < 0.0001) from time spent reading low-detail 
outcomes (M = 19.96 seconds, SD = 30.04).
For likelihood judgm ents concerning the 
actual outcomes, a  2 (hindsight, foresight) X 4 (detail-level scenario 
pairing: HL, HH, LL, LH) split-plot factorial ANOVA was performed. 
The hindsight-foresight manipulation was the between subjects
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factor, and  detail-level scenario pairings was the within-subject 
factor.
The hindsight-foresight manipulation revealed a significant 
main effect 204) = 131.79, p  < 0.0001]. This result indicates 
tha t a hindsight bias was produced. The hindsight group showed 
significantly higher likelihoods than the foresight group (see Figure 
4).
The detail-level scenario pairing manipulation revealed a 
significant main effect [F(3,612) = 3.84, = 0.0097]. Furthermore, a
significant interaction was found between the hindsight-foresight 
manipulation and the detail-level scenario pairings [F(3,612) = 2.72, 
p  < 0.0437]. The significance of this interaction was due to the 
differences in the cubic terms between hindsight and foresight 
manipulations [Fi, 204) = 5.08, p  < 0.0252]. The two groups did not 
differ in either the linear or the quadratic terms over time.
Comparisons of cell means were conducted using I ra n 's  
procedure. It was revealed that within the hindsight condition, the 
HL and HH scenario pairings were statistically significantly 
different from LL and LH pairings. No other differences were 
statistically significant (see Figure 4). This indicates the hindsight
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group showed an increase in likelihood judgments as the level of 
detail increased within the actual scenario. The foresight group 
shows no change in likelihood judgm ents across detail-level 
pairings.
For the alternative outcomes, a  
hindsight bias would be indicated by a  significantly lower 
likelihood judgm ent than under the foresight condition (i.e., 
underestimation of the likelihood of the alternative scenarios). A 2 
(hindsight, foresight) X 4 (detail-level scenario pairing: HL, HH, LL, 
LH) spüt-plot factorial ANOVA was performed. The hindsight- 
foresight manipulation was the between subjects factor and detail- 
level pairings was the within-subject factor.
The hindsight-foresight manipulation revealed a significant 
main effect [F(i, 204) = 35.58, p  < 0.0001]. The hindsight group 
produced significantly lower likelihood judgments than the 
foresight group. This result indicated tha t a hindsight bias was 
also produced for the alternative scenarios (see Figure 5).
The detail-level pairing manipulation revealed a significant 
main effect [F(3,612) = 6.35, p  = 0.0003]. Further, a signiGcant 
interaction was found between the hindsight-foresight
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manipulation and the detail-level pairings (f(3, 612) = 2.82, p  < 
0.0384). The significance of this interaction was due to the 
differences in the cubic terms between hindsight and foresight 
m anipulations [Fi, 204) = 7.25, pi < 0.0077]. The two groups did not 
differ in either the linear or the quadratic terms over time.
Examination of the cell means using Ryan's procedure 
revealed tha t within the hindsight group the likelihood judgm ent 
for the HL pairing was significantly smaller than the HH, LL or LH 
scenario pairings. The HH pairing was not significantly different 
from the LL pairing. The LH pairing was significantly larger than 
aü the other detaü-level scenario pairings. Further, the LH pairing 
was not significantly different from the foresight group. The 
foresight group showed no change in likelihood judgm ents across 
detail-level pairings.
The results from the "actual" outcome 
scenario were not quite as predicted. It was predicted tha t as the 
level of detail in the alternative outcome increased, the hindsight 
bias for the actual outcome would be reduced. This did not 
happen. In fact, the level of detail in the alternative outcome did 
not appear to affect likelihood judgm ents for the actual outcome.
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For this reason it was decided to convert the likelihood judgm ents 
to categorical data, and to examine which outcome scenario (actual 
versus alternative) received the highest likelihood more frequently.
D ata were converted into three categories: the "actual" 
outcome scenario received the highest likelihood, the alternative 
received the highest likelihood, or both were judged equally likely.
A 3 (higher rated category: actual, alternative, equally likely) X 4 
(detail-level scenario pairing: HL, HH, LL, LH) chi-square analysis 
was performed. It was found tha t fewer details in the "actual" 
outcome scenario led more individuals to rate the alternative 
outcome as more probable than or equal to the actual outcome.
The Pearson chi- square statistic provided evidence of an 
association between detail-level scenario pairing and category (X^ (6, 
456) = 60.29, p  < 0.0001). See Table 2. The cell chi-square values 
showed that most of the association is due to the HL and LH 
scenario pairings. For the HL pairing, more people judged the 
actual outcome scenario (2P = 4.6955, dela tion  /rom expected = 
20.5^ as more likely than expected, and less people judged the 
alternative outcome scenario more likely than expected (X  ^= 14.81, 
dezXadon/rom expected = -15.75/ The opposite occurs with the LH
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condition where most of the association is due to more people than  
expected judging the alternative scenario as most likely = 
19.884, delationyrom  ejxyected = 18.25j and fewer people than 
expected judging the actual scenario as most likely = 7.74, 
deviation /rom expected = -12.5/
Discussion
The foresight group shows no change in likelihood 
judgm ents across detail-level. Thus, in the absence of outcome 
knowledge, the participants' judgm ents were virtually the same no 
m atter how the actual and alternative scenarios were paired. In 
fact, the cell means ranged from a minimum of 50.26 to a 
maximum of 54.97.
However, when given outcome knowledge a hindsight bias 
was committed for both the "actual" and "alternative" scenarios. 
Participants judged the likelihood of the "actual" scenario to be 
greater under the hindsight condition than the foresight condition. 
Likewise, a hindsight bias for the alternative scenarios was 
indicated by a reduced likelihood judgm ent than under the 
foresight condition.
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The specificity of the probe had an effect on likelihood 
judgm ent when given outcome knowledge. Participants judged 
more detailed outcome scenarios as more likely than less detailed 
ones. Further, asymmetrical probing appeared to make a  
difference for the alternative outcomes. When the "actual" scenario 
was high, and the alternative outcome was sketchy, the hindsight 
bias was exaggerated for the alternative outcomes. Even more 
interesting was that when the level of detail for the "actual" 
scenario was sketchy, and the alternative scenario was high, the 
foresight and hindsight groups were not significantly different. 
Thus, a t least for the alternative scenarios the hindsight bias 
appears to have been eliminated.
At first, asymmetrical probing did not appear to have the 
same effect on the actual outcome judgments. The am ount of 
detail in the alternative outcome scenario did not affect the 
likelihood judgm ents for the actual outcome. This result led to an 
examination of the categorical data. It was found that more 
participants judged the "actual" outcome scenario to be more likely 
under the HL scenario pairing than  expected, and more than
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expected judged the alternative outcome scenario more likely 
under the LH scenario pairing. This does fit the predicted pattern.
One reason tha t the asymmetrical probing might have had a 
clearer effect on the alternative outcome is that biases for these 
judgm ents are not quite as extreme. Hindsight effect for 
alternative outcomes have been shown in other research to 
produce smaller effects and to stay closer to the participants' 
original estimates (Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975; 
Woods, 1978). Another possible reason the asymmetrical probing 
results were not as strong as predicted could be tha t the 
asymmetry may not have been extreme enough.
ChznpaTzaon (o A f C V E R F / É i / T M A comparison of 
Experiment 1 likelihood judgm ents and MINERVA-DM predictions 
is presented in Figure 6. The top curve corresponds to the actual 
scenario outcome judgm ents and the bottom curve corresponds to 
judgm ents for alternative scenarios. Two MINERVA-DM 
simulations were run. In one simulation, G was set to 0.4 to 
simulate when the actual outcome was highly detailed and the 
alternative was not. The second simulation set G to 0.8 to both 
probes having relatively high details. There were 1000 simulated
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participants and the learning parameter was set to 0.75. The 
model's predictions showed the same decrease as participants' 
estimates. This indicates that as G increases the level of detail in 
the actual and alternative scenarios becomes more similar, and the 
magnitude of the bias is reduced. This is what was found in 
Experiment 1. Thus, a greater asymmetry in the am ount of details 
used to probe memory leads to a  greater feelings of certainty for 
what actually happened and reduced feelings of certainty for what 
did not.
Experiment 2
In this experiment, the am ount of details in the probe will be 
manipulated through differential forgetting. It was predicted tha t 
more details for alternative outcomes would be forgotten over time 
than  details for "what actually happened." Conversely, a  greater 
num ber of details for "what actually happened" should be retained 
in LTM. This would naturally create an asymmetry in the probes, 
and therefore, m agni^ the hindsight bias.
PYirthermore, while vignettes are useful in studying the 
hindsight bias, the technique is artificial. A real world task  would
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provide a  stronger test of the explanation than a vignette paradigm, 
and w ould be more generalizable to settings under which the 
hindsight bias naturally occurs. Finally, fewer empirical studies 
have explored hindsight bias for real-world events.
One example of the use of a real-world event to study the 
hindsight bias is Fischhoff and Beyth (1975). They asked students 
to estim ate the likelihood tha t the United States would establish a 
diplomatic mission in Peking, tha t President Nixon would meet 
Mao at least once, and so on. Two weeks to six months after the 
trips took place, the students were asked to recall what then- 
earlier probability estimates had been, and to indicate which 
outcome(s) had in fact occurred. Fischhoff and Beyth (1975) found 
tha t the hindsight bias became more prevalent when the initial 
predictions preceded the recall task by several m onths (3 to 6 
months). For example, 84 percent of the students committed a 
hindsight bias when three to six months separated the recall task  
from actual event as opposed to 75% a t 2 weeks.
In the current experiment, two University of Oklahoma 
football games were used for real-world events. Previous research 
has also used sporting events to mimic more realistic conditions
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under which the bias could be tested (Bond-Raacke et al., 2001; 
Leary, 1981), and were able to demonstrate a hindsight bias. In 
this experiment, participants who watched a football game were 
asked to make a hypothetical judgment about how they would 
have answered if they had not known the actual outcome of the 
game.
A general knowledge test was developed and used to assess 
participants' knowledge of the football game, and knowledge of the 
University of Oklahoma football team. This test was developed in 
order to screen for individuals with a t least novice-level knowledge. 
It was also used to determine if an individual's knowledge level 
would influence h is/her memoiy for the game.
Lastly, this study manipulated the length of time between 
the initial event and the probability judgments. It was 
hypothesized tha t the probability judgm ents for "what actually 
happened" would become more extreme as the time interval 
increased (See Figure 7). Furthermore, it was predicted th a t over 
time the num ber of details remembered by participants would 
decrease for both "what actually happened" and "what might have 
happened bu t did not" (the alternative outcome). However, fewer
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details for the actual^ outcome would be lost during the delay 
between the hrst and second phase of the experiment. More 
details for alternative outcomes would be lost as time passes (see 
Figure 8).
Method
Participants (n = 59) were recruited from the 
psychology student subject pool a t the University of Oklahoma. 
Only participants who would be watching the particular football 
games (either live in the stadium or on TV) were recruited. 
Participants who merely planned to listen to the game on the radio 
were not recruited in order to keep the medium under which 
individuals experienced the game as similar as possible. Further, 
it was reasoned tha t individuals who merely listened to the game 
may not pay as close attention as those who watched. Participants 
were tested in groups of up to 15 people.
Participants were assigned to one of three groups: 1) a 
foresight group (n = 18) who made likelihood judgm ents about an
3 Here "actual" outcome refers to who actually won the game.
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upcoming football game in absence of outcome knowledge; 2) a 
hindsight group (n = 22) tha t returned two days after watching the 
game, and 3) a hindsight group (n =19) tha t returned after six 
days. To reduce attrition between first and second phases of the 
experiment, a $20.00 drawing took place during the second phase. 
In fact, no participants were lost to attrition. The experiment did 
not extend beyond a 6-day period because it was believed tha t 
watching the next week's football game would interfere with the 
memory test—memories for more recent games might weigh too 
heavily in LTM memory.
aazf Participants were asked to complete a
general knowledge quiz about football and the football team at the 
University of Oklahoma. After unsuccessful attem pts to locate a 
general knowledge football quiz, one was developed to screen for 
basic novice-level football knowledge (Appendix B). Several 
sources of football rules and information were used to develop the 
test. These included FootbnZZ/or Dummies (Long & Czamecki, 
1998), the O^ yZciaZ 1999 ZVCAA FootbaZZ FuZe Book, and the website 
www.football.com. The test consisted of 15 multiple-choice general 
knowledge questions about the game (e.g.. How many yards are
3 8
there on a  football field? How many players per team can be on 
the field during a play? What is the tight end position?), an d  five 
multiple choice questions about the Sooner football team (e.g.,
Who is th e  head coach? Who is the current starting quarterback?
). This resulted in a total of 20 questions. The test questions were 
selected on the basis of a pretest carried out on 15 participants. 
From the set of pretest questions, only questions which 2 /3  of the 
participants had answered correctly were selected.
The two football games (Oklahoma vs. Texas A & M and 
Oklahoma vs. Oklahoma State University) used in this experiment 
were chosen for two reasons: 1) they both were home games 2) they 
were both broadcast on live TV in Norman, Oklahoma, and 3) both 
were Saturday games. Also, it should be noted tha t the previous 
year was a losing season for the Oklahoma football team (5 wins to 
6 losses) and tha t the Sooners had lost to both opposing team s 
used in the experiment. Furthermore, both games were preceded 
by a  loss in the current season. Therefore, it was believed th a t 
participants would entertain the possibility tha t their home team 
could lose to the challengers.
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A true/false memory test was developed immediately 
following each football game: the University of Oklahoma vs. Texas 
A 85 M, and University of Oklahoma vs. Oklahoma State University. 
Each memory test contained 10 true statem ents tha t supported an 
OU win (THOME), 10 true statem ents that were supportive of the 
opposing team winning (TOPP), 10 false statem ents tha t were 
favorable towards the OU team (FHOME), and 10 false statem ents 
tha t were favorable to the opposition (FOPP). See Table 3 for 
examples of statements.
The author and two assistants independently watched the 
game and took detailed notes on events tha t occurred throughout 
the game. Furthermore, the game was recorded and the sports 
sections from all local papers were collected the following day in 
order to provide an independent means to verify the memorable 
events. A memorable event was selected for a "true" statem ent 
only if all three developers: 1 ) listed the event in their notes, 2 ) 
were in agreement on the event being highly memorable, and 3) 
were in agreement on whether the event was favorable for the 
Home Team or favorable for the opposition. The false statem ents 
were selected from a set of statem ents created by the test
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developers. Again, a statem ent was selected only if 1) the event 
never occurred during the game and 2) all three developers were in 
agreement on the event favoring Home Team or the opponent.
Auceefune. The first phase of the experiment took place on 
the Friday before the football game. During this phase, all 
participants took the general football knowledge quiz. The 
foresight group then proceeded to make likelihood predictions for 
the upcoming Oklahoma football game. Participants in the 
hindsight groups were then reminded to watch the football game. 
They were then asked to return either two or six days after the 
game.
Hindsight participants were asked to keep a  detailed journal 
of all the times they thought about, discussed, listened to (e.g., TV, 
radio, etc.) anything concerning the game, the team, the coaches, 
and so on between the first phase of the experiment and the 
second. The diary was used to determine if participants revisited 
their memories of the game they watched, and if so, how often. 
Also, it was im portant to determine if the longer delay condition 
resulted in more revisiting.
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During the second phase of the experiment, the memory 
diaries were collected. Participemts then took the memory test 
concerning the game and rated the likelihood of OU winning or 
losing the game. Participants were asked to make the likelihood 
judgm ents as if they had not watched the game and did not know 
the final outcome. The memory test and likelihood judgm ents were 
counterbalanced across participants to eliminate order effects. At 
the end of the session, participants were asked to recall: 1) who 
won the game, and 2) what was the final score.
Results
Three participants were removed from 
the data set before analyses were conducted—two from the 2-day 
group and one from 6-day group. These individuals scored less 
than 50% on the general knowledge test, and less than  45% on the 
memory test. This indicated tha t these individuals had little 
knowledge of the game of football, and tha t they actually scored 
worse than guessing (50%) on the memory test. This resulted in a 
final total of 56 participants: 18 participants in the foresight 
condition, 20 in the 2-day condition and 18 in the 6-day condition.
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Twenty-six participants watched the game live on their 
television sets and 12 watched it live in the stadium. No 
significant difference (2P(i,38) = 0.228, p  = 0.63) was found between 
the 2-day group (13 TV, 7 stadium) and the 6-day group (13 TV, 5 
stadium ). Furthermore, where they watched had no significant 
effect on the participants' likelihood judgments.
Finally, all participants (100%) remembered who won the 
game (OU won both games used in the experiment). Twenty-eight 
individuals accurately remembered the score and 10 did not. 
However, no significant difference (2P(i. 38) = 2.79, p  = 0.095) was 
found between the 2-day group (3 forgot, 17 remembered) and the 
6-day group (7 forgot, 11 remembered).
The three experimental groups 
(foresight, 2-day, and 6-day) were not significantly different from 
each other in their knowledge of the game and home team. The 
mean knowledge score was 79.26% (8D = 11.3). Scores ranged 
from 53% to 100%. Thus, the three groups were equally 
knowledgeable about the game of football and the OU team. 
Knowledge scores were found to be unrelated to likelihood scores.
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Æa^. To determine if a hindsight bias had 
occurred, two separate one-factor (experimental conditions: 
foresight, 2-day, and 6-day) ANOVAs were conducted on likelihood 
judgments: one for the probability of the home team (Sooners) 
winning, and one for the probability of losing.
For the probability of winning, the three conditions were 
found to be significantly different from each other (Fjg, 53) = 13.01, p  
< 0.0001). Ryan's multiple comparison procedure was used to 
determine any differences between the means. The foresight, 2-, 
and 6-day conditions differed significantly from each other in 
winning likelihood judgment. Thus, a  bias was found for both 
hindsight conditions, and further, this bias was found to 
significantly increase between the 2-day and 6-day delays (see 
Figure 9).
A significant difference was found for likelihood of losing 
judgm ents across experimental conditions (F(2 , 53) = 6.43, p  = 
0.003). Here the foresight group and the 6-day group differed 
significantly hom  each other. No other difference was significant 
(see Figure 9).
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Afezoo/y: The 2-day and 6-day groups did not differ from 
each other on overall memory scores (t (36) = 1.56, p  = 0.064). The 
mean memory score was 65.8% (SD = 9.09). The range was 53 to 
85% correct.
Next, the subsections of the memory test were examined 
separately. See Table 4 for a comparison of the mean scores for 
each subsection across experimental conditions. THOME,
FHOME, and FOPP subsections of the test did not differ across the 
hindsight conditions. However, the 2-day hindsight condition (M = 
71%, SD -  23.09) was significantly better than (bse) = 2.34, p  = 
0.03) the 6-day hindsight condition (M = 51.39%, SD 21.45) for the 
TOPP subsection. See Figure 10. This meant tha t while memories 
for items favoring the home team winning did not differ across 
time, memory for items favoring the opponent winning did. These 
details were forgotten at a faster rate. Thus, details favoring 
alternative outcomes were forgotten a t a  much higher rate.
No significant relation was found between 
participant's likelihood judgm ents and the overall memory test 
score. However, a  significant, negative relation was found between 
the subsection for true statem ents concerning the opponent (TOPP)
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and likelihood judgments. The more accurate the participants' 
memory for events favorable to the opponent, the lower the 
likelihood judgm ent for winning (r = -0.6, p  < 0.0001). Further, a 
significant, positive relation was found between memoiy for true 
items favoring the opposition and the likelihood of losing. The 
more accurate memory for events favoring the opponent, the 
greater the judged likelihood of losing (r= 0.55, p  = 0.0003). These 
two correlations accounted for 36% and 30% of the variation in the 
likelihood judgments respectively. No other significant relation 
was found for the subsections of the memory test.
To summarize, these findings indicated tha t it was not so 
m uch what these participants remembered, bu t w hat they forgot 
tha t affected their judgments. Memories for information 
supporting the vidnning team were virtually the same for the 2-day 
and 6-day groups. However, true information about the opposition 
started out a t the same level as true statem ents for the home team 
at 2-days, bu t then dropped (or faded) significantly by six days.
The change in the likelihood judgm ents was related to this loss of 
memories for information favoring the opponent.
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ZTzarz'eg. One individual in the 6-day hindsight group did not 
tu rn  in a  diary. This individual was allowed to complete the  
second p h ase  of the experiment, but was not entered into th e  $20 
drawing. Also, another diaiy from the 6-day group was found to be 
unacceptable. It contained only entries of a personal nature , and 
none concerning the game. Therefore, this dieiry was excluded 
from the analysis. Thus, a total of 36 diaries were analyzed (16 for 
the 6-day, and 20 for the 2-day).
First, the diary entries were subdivided into "revisiting" units 
-  entries th a t clearly indicated the participant spent time thinking 
about and  remembering the football game. Participants naturally  
provided discrete intervals between entries in the diaries. Next, a 
coding scheme was developed to c lassic  the idea units. Five major 
and 10 minor categories were developed. See Table 5 for a list of 
the categories and a brief description. Note tha t many dairy 
entries consisted merely of a  statem ent remembering to record an 
entry (i.e., nothing today, ju s t remembered to make an  entiy). The 
author assumed th a t even this would trigger some revisiting of the 
game, even if only cursoiy. Thus, these entries were coded. Using 
the coding scheme the author and an associate coded each diaiy
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unit. Differences in coding were resolved through discussion. 
Coders only disagreed on three (3) out of 307 entries. The overall 
agreement was 99.02%, kappa 0.9835, z = 27.7882, p  < 0.0001.
It w as decided to focus on the five main categories and to 
determine the percentage of entries tha t fell into each category. 
Figure 11 gives the percentage of entries falling into each category 
for the 2-day and 6-day. The only main category in which the two 
conditions differed significantly (t(34) = -3.22, p  = 0.003) was in the 
proportion of journaling entries. The 6-day journaling comprised 
an average of 20.56 % of the entries as opposed to 5.63% for the 2- 
day condition. For both hindsight conditions, only one 
subcategory got above 7%; watching TV (19.02% for 2-day, 16.84% 
for 6-day).
The total num ber of entries per participant was also 
examined. The 6-day condition had significantly (t(34) = -4.76, p  < 
0.0001) more dairy entries (M = 11.19, SD = 3.71) than  the 2-day 
condition (M = 6.4, SD = 2.28). Though this is not surprising it 
does show tha t the 6-day delay group did revisit events from the 
game. This may explain why the THOME memories did not differ 
across the 2-day and 6-day delays.
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Discussion
To reiterate, participants' memories for events tha t favored 
the home team did not differ over time, bu t favorable memories for 
the opponent did. Over time the num ber of details remembered by 
participants decreased for the alternative outcome (the home team 
losing). However, memory for details of the actual outcome barely 
changed.
The fact tha t the participants revisited the game often may 
indicate why there was no difference in the memory scores for 
events favoring the Home Team. Revisiting the memories may have 
reinstantiated those memories, making them less susceptible to 
forgetting. Furthermore, considering tha t all the subjects were OU 
students and fans, they probably did not revisit as frequently 
information tha t was positive for the opponent. In fact, out of the 
307 total entries, only one was negative towards the Home Team 
and there were no positive references toward the opposition.
Almost all entries were congratulatory in some way (e.g., we 
discussed how great it was to beat Texas A & M).
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These results demonstrated that there was differential 
forgetting of the details for the "actual" outcome versus what might 
have happened, but did not. Also, probability judgments became 
more extreme as the asymmetry in the details remembered 
increased. Thus, differential forgetting may be one of the factors 
contributing to the differences in the probes, and may be one of the 
reasons the hindsight bias becomes more extreme over time.
Cbmparfgon A-ecbctzong. As in Experiment
1, two MINERVA-DM simulations were performed. In the first 
simulation, G was set to 0.4. This simulates a  situation where the 
probe for the actual outcome scenario is highly detailed and the 
probe for what did not occur has relatively few details. In the 
second simulation, G was set to 0.8, and simulates situations 
where both probes (what actually happened and what did not) have 
relatively high levels of details. There were 1000 simulated 
participants; the Learning param eter was set to 0.75.
Figure 12 shows a comparison between MINERVA-DM 
predictions and the results from Experiment 2. The top line 
corresponds to the judgments concerning the actual outcome (the 
home team winning) and the bottom line corresponds to the
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judgm ents for the alternative outcome (the home team losing). The 
model predictions have the same functional form as the results 
from Experiment 2. However, the likelihood judgm ents for 
Experiment 2 were more extreme than  MINERVA-DM predicted. 
That may have been because the home team won both games by a 
large margin, and thus, may have been more memorable than most 
games.
In conclusion, when the level of detail is less similar between 
the actual outcome and the alternative outcome the magnitude of 
the bias is greater. As in Experiment 1, a greater asymmetiy in the 
am ount of details used to probe memory led to a greater feeling of 
certainty for what actually happened. Finally, differential 
forgetting of details results in a greater asymmetry; thus, 
increasing the magnitude of the hindsight bias over time.
General Discussion
The research reported in this paper dem onstrates tha t the 
am ount of detail used to probe LTM influences the magnitude of 
the hindsight bias. As the level of detail increased for an outcome, 
so did its judged probability. When the outcome was "what
51
actually happened," this led to an excessive feeling of certainty; 
thus producing the hindsight bias. However, for alternative 
outcomes the hindsight bias was reduced by increasing the details 
in its probe. Because the hindsight bias for alternatives is 
expressed in terms of excessive feelings of improbability, an 
increase in feelings of certainty reduces its bias.
Furthermore, asymmetrical probing of LTM (i.e., using one 
probe th a t is highly detailed, and one tha t is sketchy) exaggerated 
these effects. When the probe for the actual event was highly 
detailed and the alternative was sketchy, it led to an even more 
extreme feelings of certainty for what actually happened, and 
reduced feelings of certainty for what might have happened but did 
not. In other words, it magnified the effects of the hindsight bias 
for both outcomes.
This type of detail-level pairing of outcomes most closely 
matches the natural circumstances under which the hindsight 
bias occurs. Under ordinaiy circumstances, people are provided 
with few details concerning the alternatives. For example, the 
media rarely give a balanced picture with equal time and details for 
alternative scenarios. In fact, most details for 'Svhat might have
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happened, but did not" are internally generated; and internally 
generated memories are naturally less detailed than real ones 
(Johnson & Raye, 1981).
Even more remarkable though is the fact tha t the hindsight 
bias for the alternative scenarios was eliminated when the level of 
detail for the alternative scenario was high and the actual scenario 
was sketchy. Under these conditions, the foresight and hindsight 
judgm ents for the alternative scenario contained similar levels of 
certainty. However, the hindsight bias for what actually happened 
was merely reduced by increasing the am ount of details in the 
alternative outcome; it was not eliminated. This speaks to the 
robustness and tenacity of this bias. Biases for actual events are 
more extreme and thus, it may require a vast am ount of details 
regarding the alternatives to eliminate them. Further, it is much 
easier to make judgments about the occurrence of an event than  to 
make judgm ents about how unlikely an event is to occur.
In the current studies, three 
factors contributed to the different levels of details in the probes. 
First, the level of detail was provided by the experimenter's 
decision task (Experiment 1) via the vignettes. Second, different
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rates of forgetting (Experiment 2) coupled with the revisiting of 
certain old memories resulted in vaiying levels of detail. Revisiting 
the memories may have reinstantiated the memories; m aking them 
less susceptible to forgetting. Over time details for the alternative 
scenarios will fade faster than details for the actual scenario.
A th ird  possible factor for contributing details to the probe is 
false memories. Real world decision tasks require an individual to 
discriminate between different sources of information, and h is /h e r  
memory for source is often imperfect (Johnson et al, 1993).
Further, no memory is based purely on externally generated 
information; all memory traces have some degree of cognitive 
elaboration (Johnson & Raye, 1981). Revisiting these memories 
(e.g., watching ESPN or discussing the game with friends) may 
have allowed the participants to develop false memories for the 
game. Thus, false memories could play some role in inflating the 
level of certainty by adding false details to the probes.
In Experiment 2, errors of commission may have played a 
role in producing the hindsight bias for the 2-day delay condition. 
For this group, equal num bers of details concerning the game were 
remembered for both outcome scenarios (actual versus alternative
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scenarios; winning versus losing). However, participants made 
considerably more errors of accepting false statem ents favoring the 
home team  winning as true, as opposed to false statem ents 
favoring th e  opposition. Participants accepted 68% of false 
statem ents favoring the home team, and only 33% of those favoring 
the opposition. These false memories may have boosted the level of 
detail for a  win.
Over time more false memories for "what actually happened" 
might be generated, thus creating more details tha t could be used 
to probe memory. Future researchers should attem pt to address 
the issue of the use of detailed memories and false memories in the 
hindsight bias with other circum stances.
There are a few alternative 
explanations for the results demonstrated in this paper. One 
explanation is tha t traces for "what actually occurs" are better 
encoded into LTM than those for the alternatives. Another 
explanation entails a greater num ber of traces in LTM for "what 
actually happened" as opposed to "what might have happened bu t 
did not". In other words, the probes are not different for what 
actually happened versus what might have happened. Instead, the
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traces in LTM match the probe better, because they are more 
detailed and more abundant.
MINERVA-DM simulations were run  varying the learning 
param eter, and the num ber of traces stored in LTM. From these 
simulations, MINERVA-DM predicts tha t if the level of detail is held 
relatively the same for both outcomes probes (G = 0.8), better 
encoding or increasing memory traces gives the actual outcome 
only a slightly higher probability. In other words, both could 
produce a  bias, but their effect would be minimal compared to 
varying the level of detail in the probes. It should be noted that 
MINERVA-DM does predict tha t when there is a disparity in the 
am ount of details in the probe, better encoding and large num bers 
of traces further exaggerate the hindsight bias.
Empirical evidence validates MINERVA-DM's explanations, 
and backs up the results from the current research. First, the 
hindsight bias is smaller for easier questions as opposed to harder 
ones (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990). Easier questions are better 
encoded, and information concerning such questions is believed to 
be more frequent in memory. Further, experts have been shown to 
exhibit smaller and slightly less excessive hindsight biases than
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laypersons (Christensen-SzalEinski & Wilham, 1991; Pohl, 1992).
In fact, Pohl (1992) did not Gnd any differences between experts 
and laypersons as far as the hindsight bias is concerned. Thus, 
expertise neither eliminates nor enhances the bias. A greater 
am ount of knowledge (larger number of traces) and better encoding 
of relevant information are characteristic of expert decision makers 
(Shanteau, 1988). If encoding and a greater number of traces were 
to have an  affect on the hindsight bias, one would expect experts to 
have exaggerated effects, and not be similar to laypersons.
The current research, also, provides evidence to counter the 
alternative explanations. For example, the depth of encoding was 
similar for both the actual outcome and the alternative in 
Experiment 2. The 2-day delay participants remembered equal 
am ounts of details for the actual outcome (Home team wins) as for 
the alternative (opposition wins). Furthermore, in Experiment 1 
participants were exposed to both the actual and alternative 
outcomes only once. Therefore, the num ber of traces placed in 
long-term memoiy was similar for both outcome scenarios.
However, one could not rule out the possibility tha t 
Experiment 2 participants laid down new traces in LTM while
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revisiting memories for the game. These new traces would tend  be 
biased tow ards the actual outcome, since no diary entries 
concerned the alternative outcome. Furthermore, these traces 
could subsequently used to access similar traces in LTM, and 
further boost the feelings of certainty
MINERVA-DM predicts that it is not whether alternative scenarios 
are used to probe memoiy, but rather the level of detail contained 
in these probes. In other words, it is not the number of 
alternatives that an individual generates, but rather it is the degree 
of detail in the alternative probe tha t causes a reduction in the 
hindsight bias. In fact, Sanna, Schwartz, and Stocker (2002) 
found th a t listing many counterfactual thoughts was experienced 
as difficult, and consistently increased the hindsight bias for what 
participants believed was the ''actual" outcome. Thus, generating 
more alternatives did not lessen the bias, bu t instead made the 
alternatives seem less likely because they were so hard  to produce. 
This mechanism is similar to Tversky and Kahneman (1973) 
avaüability bias.
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Generating more details for an alternative may work better 
than  generating more alternative probes, because what is 
contained within the probe shapes the reconstruction of the 
likelihood judgment (Hawkins & Hastie, 1990; Pohl, Eisenhauer, 85 
Hardt, 2003; Schwartz & Stahlberg, 2003). The reconstruction 
process involves searching LTM for evidence relevant to the task. 
The probe influences the reconstruction process, by selectively 
increasing access to information in memoiy tha t is consistent with 
the probe. Next, the evidence is evaluated, weighted and 
recombined to produce an overall judgm ent (Hawkins & Hastie, 
1990). The probes could bias the memoiy search towards 
information relevant to what actually happened (biased sampling) 
by ignoring details concerning alternative scenarios. Asking 
individuals to generate detailed alternative scenarios may lead 
these individuals to decrease the likelihood of the outcome they 




People's tendency to overestimate the accuracy with which 
they could predict past events occurs quite frequently in th e  real 
world. MINERVA-DM provides a new explanation for the cognitive 
processes tha t underlie the hindsight bias. It may also provide 
ideas for new techniques to debias individuals, such as having an 
individual generate a very detailed description of a single 
alternative outcome.
The research in this paper lends support to MINERVA-DM as 
a coherent and integrative theory for likelihood judgments. 
MINERVA-DM provides a theoretical framework in which to 
conduct future judgment and decision making research. Future 
success would indicate tha t there may be ju s t a few overarching 
cognitive mechanisms tha t cause the various heuristics and biases 
studied by decision researchers. Already, MINERVA-DM has been 
used to account for heuristics and biases such as the availability 
bias (Dougherty & Franco-Watkins, 2003), overconfidence 
(Dougherty, 2001), as well as conditional judgments, 
representiveness, base-rate neglect, the conjunction effect and so
6 0
on (see Dougherty, Gettys & Ogden, 1999 for a more 
comprehensive list). MINERVA-DM provides an exciting 
theoretical framework in which to examine how these heuristics 
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MINERVA-DM Simulation Program. The program was written 
originally by Charles F. Gettys.
uses CRT, TURBOS, Default;
Const 
SlotsInField = 9;
ElementsInVector = 3 * SlotsInField; {Each trace vector has 27 
elements.
9 Ds, 9 Hs, and 9 Cs}




MinTraceiype = 3; {Determines min. number of -1, 0, +1 values 
in vector}
SlotsInProbe : byte = MinTraceiype * 9;
Debug : boolean = false{true};
RevisedOn = '9 /25 /96 ';
71
type
RandomArray = array[L.ElementsinVector] of shortint;
CharSet = set of char; 
var
ProbeArr : array[l.. MaxData, !.. MaxHyps, L.ElementsinVector] 
of shortint;
TraceArr : RandomArray; (The Trace array}
FreqHandD : array[ 1..MaxData, ! ..MaxHyps] of word; {f(H&D) 
array}
Intensity : array [ 1. .MaxData, !.. MaxHyps] of real;
Sumlntensity : array [ 1. .MaxData, !.. MaxHyps] of real;
Similarity : array [1.. MaxData, ! ..MaxHyps] of real;
EkzhoContent: array[ 1..MaxData, ! ..MaxHyps,
1. .ElementsInVector] of real;
SumSim : array[ 1..MaxData, ! ..MaxHyps] of real;
NSum : array [ 1.. MaxData, !.. MaxHyps] of longint;
RndArr : RandomArray;
RndArr2 : RandomArray;
i, j : word;
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NumHyps : byte; {number of hypotheses}
NumDs : byte; {number of data}
L : real; {Hintzman's learning rate parameter}
TracesMade : word; {Traces created by the program}
NumberReps : word; {Number of trials in the simulation}
Params : text; {Parameter file containing last values used} 
TypeSim : char; {Specifies type of simulation wanted}
Conjunction: char; {Specifies type of conjunction effect wanted} 
HCrit : real; {critical value of H for No Base rate search}
Context : char; {Specifies tha t contextual cues will be used (y or
n)}
Experimental : char; {Specifies if it is experimental, or non-exp 
context}
NumContexts: byte; {specifies num ber of contexts used: O=none, 
l=many}
ChangeL : char; {if 'Y' changes L to study avalability}
NumCorrect : longint; {Count of num ber of correct inferences 
made by M3}
NumWrong : longint; {count of incorrect inferences}
LValidity : real; {value of L for validity effect routine. Suggest >=.9}
73
NumTrActîve: byte; {Number of traces tha t will have high value of 
L}
TrActive : byte; {Temporaiy variable for NumTrActive}
GrandSum l,
GrandSumS : real; {Sums used in summary}
NumExtras : word; {Number of extra-experimental context 
vectors}
Ch : char;




Xpos, Ypos : byte;
begin
Xpos := wherex; Ypos := wherey;







if (Ch = 'd') or (Ch = 'D') then Debug := false; 
end;
procedure Delay (Time : word) ; 
var 
i, j :word; 
begin
for i := 1 to Time do J  := j; 
end;
procedure Rearrange(var RandomVector: RandomArray; 
MinValue, MaxValue: integer);
{randomizes using sampling without replacement)
var




for i := MaxValue downto MinValue do 
begin
RandomPick := Random(i-MinValue) + MinValue + 1; 
{write(randomPick: 5) ;}
SwapValue := RandomVector[i];
RandomVector[i] := RandomVector[RandomPick] ; 
RandomVector [RandomPick] := SwapValue; 
end; 
end;
procedure title; {Title display for DPL programs} 
var
Sp : string[12];
Ch : char; 
begin
Sp := chr(13)+chr(10)+' ';
writeln(sp,'Title: MINERVA3'); 
writeln(sp,'Author: Chuck Gettys'); 
writeln(sp,'Date Created: 11/7/95');
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writeln(sp,'Comments: Modification to MINERVA2 to deal with 
likelihoods.');
if param connt = 0 then 
begin
repeat until keypressed;




procedure GetVariables; {Allows the user to sp ec if  variables} 
var
H, D : byte;
PromptStr : string; 
begin
Conjunction:=CharDefault('Conjunction effect[use with H&D 
only,H>=3,D=l]:(Y-Yes,N-No)?',
Conjunction, ['Y', 'N']);
TypeSim := CharDefault('Analysis Wanted:(F-Freq, B-H&D, L- 
L(D|H), P-L(H|D), C-Cond.)?',
77
TypeSim, ['F', 'B', 'L', 'C']);
TypeSim := CharDefault('More Choices: (E-Echo,S-Hsight,X- 
Expert,V-Validity,H-Hintz.)?',
TypeSim,['E', 'S', 'X', 'V, 'H']);
if TYpeSim = 'V then 
begin
LValidity := RealDefault('L for activated traces wanted (Suggest 
L>=.9)?', LValidity);
NumTrActive := ByteDefault('Number of active traces 
wanted?', NumTrActive) ; 
end;
Context := CharDefault('Context effects wanted: (Y- yes, N- no)'. 
Context, ['Y', 'N']);
ChangeL := CharDefault('Changes in L with H wanted (for 
availability): (Y- yes, N- no)',
ChangeL, ['Y', 'N']);
NumberReps := WordDefault('Number of trials in the simulation?', 
NumberReps);
L := RealDefault('Leaming rate parameter?', L);
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HCrit := RealDefaiilt('S criterion for H. (Range -1.0 to +1.0)
HCrit);
{PS := realDeiault('Probe similarity. Range: 0 to + 1 ?', PS);} 
NumHyps := ByteDefault('Number of Hypotheses?', NumHyps); 
NnmDs := ByteDefault('Number of data?', NumDs); 
writeln;
writeln('Now you will enter the frequencies of H and D:'); 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
PromptStr := 'HandD('+ chr(48+H) + + chr(48+D) + ') (0-










i, NumsIiïMiniVector : byte; 
begin
NnmsInMiniVector := 3 * M inTracel^e; 




RndArr[i+2*MinTraceType] := 1; 
end;




NnmsInMiniVector = 3 * MinTracel^pG; 
var
i, j, k, H, D : byte;
Ch : char;
HMiniVector : array[!..MaxHyps,!..NnmsInMiniVector] of shortint;
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DMiniVector : array[l..MaxData,!..NnmsInMiniVector] of shortint; 
begin
for i := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
CreateVector; {Make H vector} 
for j := 1 to NnmsInMiniVector do 
HMiniVector[i,j] := RndArr[j]; 
end;
for i := 1 to NnmDs do 
begin
CreateVector; {Make D vector} 
for j := 1 to NnmsInMiniVector do 
DMiniVector[ij] := RndArr|j]; 
end;
CreateVector; {Make C vector}
for D := 1 to NnmDs do 
for H := 1 to NnmHyps do 
for i := 1 to NnmsInMiniVector do 
begin
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ProbeArr[D,H,i] := DMiniVector[D,i]; 
ProbeArr[D,H,i+NumsInMiniVector] := HMiniVector[H,i]; 
ProbeArr[D,H,i+2 * NumsInMiniVector] := RndArr[i]; 
end; {Now, even for H=l, there is an unique D component. A 
change!} 
if Debug then 
begin
writeln('Output of BuildProbes. Probe vectors generated:'); 
writeln('D# H# Data part Hypothesis part Context
part');
for j := 1 to NumDs do 
for k  := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin 
write(j:2, k:2, ' ');
for i := 1 to 3 * NnmsInMiniVector do 
begin
write(ProbeArr[j, k, i]:2); 








procedure CreateTrace(D,H: byte; Context, Experimental : char); 
{creates a single trace according to specifications supplied} 
var
Slot, EndSlot : byte;
LTemp : real; 
begin
{Experimental := 'Y';} {Temp only} 
if Context = Y' then EndSlot := 27 else EndSlot := 18; 
for Slot := 1 to EndSlot do 
TraceArr[Slot] := ProbeArr[D,H,Slot]; 
if not (Context=Y') then 
for Slot := 19 to 27 do 
TraceArr [Slot] := 0; 
if (Conjunction = 'Y') and (TypeSim = 'B') and (H<3) then 
for Slot := 1 to 9
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do TraceArr[Slot] := 0; {Conjuction fallacy. H should be >= 31!!!} 
if (Context = "Y') and (not (Experimental= 'Y')) then 
Rearrange(TraceArr, 19,27); 
if ChangeL <> Y' then 
begin
if (lypeSim = 'V') and (TrActive > 0) then 
begin 
Ltemp := L;
L := LValidity * 1000; 
end;
for Slot := 1 to EndSlot do 
if random(lOOO) > L then TraceArr [Slot] := 0; {L fixed cond.} 
if (lypeSim = 'V') and (TrActive > 0) then 
begin 
L := LTemp;




for Slot := 1 to EndSlot do {L variable cond.}
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if random(lOOO) > (L * H) then TraceArr [Slot] := 0; 
if Debug then 
begin
writeln('Current TraceArray (D part, H part, C part):'); 
write(D:2,H:2,Context:2,Experimental:2, ' '); 
for Slot := 1 to 27 do 
begin
write(TraceArr[Slot] : 2) ; 






Function CalcSim(D, H : byte; Context : Char; StartCalc, EndCalc: 
byte) : real; 
var 




Sum Product := 0.0;
N := 0;
for i := StartCalc to EndCalc do 
begin
SumProduct := SumProduct + ProbeArr[D,H,i] * TraceArr[i];
if (not (ProbeArr[D,H,i]=0)) or (not (TraceArr[i]=0)) then inc(N); 
end;
if Debug then 
begin




if N > 0 then CalcSim := SumProduct/N 
else
CalcSim := 0; 
end;
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Function CalcE)choSini(D, H:byte; Context: Char; StartCalc, 
EndCalc:byte):real; 
var 
i, j, N : byte;




for i := StartCalc to EndCalc do 
begin
SumProduct := SumProduct 
+ ProbeArr[D,H,i] * EchoContent[D, H, i]; 
if (not (ProbeArr[D,H,i]=0)) or (not (E)choContent[D, H, i]=0)) 
then inc(N); 
end; 
if Debug then 
begin





if N > 0 then CalcEchoSim := SnmProdnct/N 
else
CalcEchoSim := 0; 
end;
procedure DoFreq; {Frequency estimation simulation routine} 
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc, NumCon, LastCon 
byte;
FHandD, LastFreq: word;
S, S3 : real; {Hintzman's similarity}
Ch : char;
begin 
if Context = "Y" then 
EndCalc := 27;






LastCon := 0; 
end;
StartCalc := 10; {Do similarity starting at slot 10 to ignore 
data' mini-vector} 
for NumCon := 0 to LastCon do 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
if NumCon = 0 then LastFreq := FreqHandD[H,D] 
else
LastFreq := NumExtras div (NumHyps * NumDs); {Note: a 
slight error may be introduced here because of integer division. Fix 
is to make sure (NumHyps * NumDs) is an exact mutiple of 
NumExtras.)
for FHandD := 1 to LastFreq do 
begin 
if NumCon = 0 then 
CreateTrace (D,H, Context, ' Y' )
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else
CreateTrace(D,NumHyps,Context, 'N');{all non-exp 
contexts dumped H3}
for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, StartCalc,
EndCalc);
SumSim[NumD,NumH] := SumSim[NumD,NumH] + S; 
Sumlntensity[NumD,NumH] := 
8umIntensity[NumD,NumH] + S * S * S; 
if Debug then 
begin 
S3 := S * S * S;
writeln('D=',NumD:2, ' H=',NumH:2, ' S=',S:8:3,








procedure DoHandD; {Conjuction simulation routine} 
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc, NumCon, LastCon 
byte;
FHandD, LastFreq: word;
S, S3 : real; {Hintzman's similarity}
Ch : char;
begin 
if Context = Y' then 
begin 
EndCalc := 27;






LastCon := 0; 
end;
StartCalc := 1; {Do similarily starting at slot 1} 
for NumCon := 0 to LastCon do 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
if NumCon = 0 then LastFreq := FreqHandD[H,D] 
else
LastFreq := NumExtras div (NumHyps * NumDs); {Note: a 
light error may be introduced here because of integer division. Fix 
is to make sure (NumHyps * NumDs) is an exact mutiple of 
NumExtras.)
for FHandD := 1 to LastFreq do 
begin 
if NumCon = 0 then 
begin






CreateTrace(D,NumHyps,Context, 'N');{all non-exp 
contexts dumped H3}
for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, StartCalc, 
EndCalc);
SumSim[NumD,NumH] := 8umSim[NumD,NumH] + S; 
Sumlntensity [NumD, NumH] := 
SumIntensity[NumD,NumH] + S * S * S; 
if Debug then 
begin 
S3 := S * S * S;
writeln('D=',NumD:2, ' H=',NumH:2, ' S=',S:8:3,








procedure DoDGivenH; {minervaS calculation for
repr e sentativene s s}
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc : byte; 
FHandD : word;
S : real; {Hintzman's similarity}
Ch : char;
begin
StartCalc := 10; {Do similarity starting a t slot 10} 
if Context = 'Y' then EndCalc := 27 else EndCalc := 18; 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
for FHandD := 1 to FreqHandD[H,D] do 
begin
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CreateTrace(D ,H, Context, "Y) ; 
for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, StartCalc,
EndCalc);
if S >= HCrit then {similarity of H and C exceeds HCrit} 
begin
inc(N8um[NumD,NumH]); {So MEAN similarity can
be calculated)
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH,Context, 1,9); {Calculate D) 
SumSim[NumD,NumH] := SumSim[NumD,NumH] + S;
SumIntensity[NumD,NumH] := 
SumIntensity[NumD,NumH] + S * S * S; 
end;
if Debug then 
begin







procedure DoHGivenD; {Does P(H | D) minervaS calculation} 
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc : byte;
FHandD : word;
S : real; {Hintzman's similarity}
Ch : char;
begin
StartCalc := 10; {Do similarity starting a t slot 10} 
if Context = 'Y' then EndCalc := 27 else EndCalc := 18; 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
for FHandD := 1 to FreqHandD[H,D] do 
begin
CreateTrace(D ,H,Context, Y) ;
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fo r  NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, 1, 9); 
if Debug then 
begin
writeln('Conditional: D=',D:2,' H=',H:2,' 
DP=',NumD:2, ' HP=',NumH:2, ' S=',8:8:3);
WaitForKey;
end;
if 8 >= HCrit then {similarity of D and C exceeds HCrit} 
begin




8um8im[NumD,NumH] := 8um8im[NumD,NumH] + S; 
8umlntensity[NumD,NumH] :=















i, j, k : byte; 
begin
for i := 1 to NumDs do 
for j := 1 to NumHyps do 
for k := 1 to 27 do 
EchoContent[i, j, k) := 0.0
end;
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procedure DoEcho; {Echo content calculation routine} 
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc, NumCon, LastCon, Slot 
byte;
FHandD, LastFreq: word;




if Context = 'Y' then 
begin 
EndCalc := 27;





LastCon := 0; 
end;
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StartCalc := 1; {Do sim ilari^ starting at slot 1} 
for NumCon := 0 to LastCon do 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
if NumCon = 0 then LastFreq := FreqHandD[H,D] 
else
LastFreq := NumExtras div (NumHyps * NumDs); {Note: a 
slight error may be introduced here because of integer division. Fix 
is to make sure (NumHyps * NumDs) is an exact mutiple of 
NumExtras.}
for FHandD := 1 to LastFreq do 
begin 
if NumCon = 0 then 
CreateTrace (D,H, Context, ' Y) 
else
CreateTrace(D,NumHyps,Context, N');{all non-exp 
contexts dumped H3}
for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do
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begin
S := CalcSlm(NnmD,NumH, Context, StartCalc, 
EndCalc) ;{Eql}
SumSim[NiimD,NiimH] := SmnSim[NumD,NuniH] + S; 
Activation := S * S * S; {Equation 2} 
for Slot := 1 to EndCalc do 
EchoContent[NumD, NumH, Slot] := 
B)choContent[NumD, NumH, Slot]
+ Activation * TraceArr[Slot]; {E)quation 4} 
if Debug then 
begin
writeln('D=',NumD:2, ' H=',NumH:2, ' S=',S:8:3); 
if TypeSim = 'E' then 
begin
writeln('Preliminary Echo Content calculations:'); 
for Slot := 1 to Endcalc do 
writeln('Slot=', Slot:3,' EcCon=', 
EchoContent[NumD, NumH, Slot]: 12:3,
' Act=',Activation: 12:3, ' TrArr=',








for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
S := CalcE)cho8im(D,H, Context, StartCalc, EndCalc); 
SumSim[D,H] := SumSim[D,H] + S; 
SumIntensity[D,H] :=





i,j, Slot : byte; 
begin
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for i := 1 to NumDs do 
for j := 1 to NumHyps do 
begiu




8um8im[iJ] := 0.0; 
if iype8im  = 'E' then 
for 81ot := 1 to 27 do 









GraiïdSumS := 0; 
for i := 1 to NumDs do 
for j := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
SumSim[i,j] := SumSim[i,j]/(NumberReps*NSum[i,j]); 
GrandSumS := GrandSumS + SumSim[ij];
Sumlntensity [ij ] := 
SumIntensity[ij]/(NumberReps*NSum[ij]);





writelnC D H','Mean 'Mean 8 :10, 'S(H/^D)':10);
for i := 1 to NumDs do 
for j := 1 to NumHyps do 
writeln(i:3, j:3, 8umlntensity[ij]:14:3,
(Sumlntensity[i j]/GrandSumI): 10:4,
SumSim[ij]:10:4, (SumSim[ij]/GrandSumS):10:4 ); 
if NumCorrect <>0 then
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begin
writeln('Note: above matrix is based on one rep only, 
disregard! 11);
writeln('Correct inferences: NumCorrect, ' Incorrect:
NnmWrong,
' P(C)= (NumCorrect/(NumCorrect+NumWrong)):6:3); 
end;




H, D : byte; 
begin
assign(Params, 'minervaS.val'); 











for H := 1 to NumHyps do 







H, D : byte; 
begin 
Conjunction := 'N';
T Y p e S im  :=  'B';
Context := 'N';
if Context = Y' then NumCon texts := 1
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else
NumContexts := 0; 







for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
FreqHandD[D,H) := 25; 
NumExtras := 0; 
NumCorrect := 0; 
NumWrong := 0;
LValidity := 0.95;





H, D : byte;




OK := (lOresult = 0); 










for H := 1 to NumHyps do 













iT ioresult <> 0 then rewrite(DataOut); 
writeln(DataOut) ; 
writeln (DataOut) ;
writeln(DataOut,'Minerva3 output. Last Revised: RevisedOn);





if TypeSim = 'V then 
begin
writeln(DataOnt, 'Value of L for validity effect routine: 
LValidity);
writeln(DataOut, 'Number of traces tha t had a high value of L: 
', NumT rActive) ; 
end;
if TypeSim = 'S' then 
writeln(DataOut,'D= 1 ,H= 1 corresponds to scenario active in 
memory');
writeln(DataOut,'Context Used: ', Context); 
writeln (DataOut, L changed: ', ChangeL); 
writeln(DataOut, Number of trials: NumberReps); 
writeln (DataOut,L= ', (L/1000.0):4:2); 
writeln(DataOut,'H Critical value: ', HCrit:4:2); 
writeln(DataOut, Number Hypotheses: ', NumHyps); 
writeln(DataOut,'Number Data: ', NumDs); 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
writeln(DataOut,'f(',H:2,',',D:2,')= ', FreqHandD[H,D]);
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writeln(DataOut, 'Number extra exp. contexts: NumExtras);
writeln(DataOut, ' ');
writeln(DataOut,' H D','Mean I': 12, 'I(D/^H)':10, 'Mean S': 10, 
'S(H/^D)':10); 
for i := 1 to NumDs do 
for j := 1 to NumHyps do 
writeln(DataOutJ:2, i:2,' ',SumIntensity[i,j]:10:4, 
(Sumlntensity[i j]/GrandSumI): 10:4,
SumSim[i,j]:10:4, (8um8im[iJ]/GrandSumS):10:4 ); 
if NumCorrect <>0 then 
begin
writeln(DataOut,'Note: above matrix is based on one rep. only, 
disregardin');
writeln(DataOut,'Correct inferences: ', NumCorrect, ' Incorrect: 
', NumWrong,





procedure  GetCm dLineParam s;
var
Code, H, D, j : word;
Temp : string; 
begin 
Temp := param8tr(l);




ChangeL := Temp[l]; 
val(paramstr(4), NumberReps, Code); 
val(paramstr(5), L, Code); 
val(paramstr(6), HCrit, Code); 
val(paramstr(7), NumHyps, Code); 
val(paramstr(8), NumDs, Code); 
if NumHyps * NumDs >12 then 
begin






for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin 
inc(j);
val(paramstr(j), FreqHandD[H,D], Code); 
end; 
end;
procedure DoExpert; {procedure to examine growth of expertise} 
var




if Sum lntensity[l,l] > Sumlntensity} 1,2] then inc(NumCorrect)
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else inc(NumWrong); 
if Sumlntensity[2,2] > Sumlntensity[2,l] then inc(NnmCorrect) 
else inc(NumWrong);
{writeln('Correct: NinnCorrect:4, ' wrong: NumWrong);}
{WaitForKey;}
if (NumCorrect+NumWrong)>= NumberReps then exit; 
for i := 1 to NumDs do 













p ro ced u re  DoConditional;
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc : byte; 
FHandD : word;
S : real; {Hintzmau's similarity}
Ch : char;
begin
StartCalc := 10; {Do similarity starting a t slot 10} 
if Context = Y' then EndCalc := 27 else EndCalc := 18; 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
for FHandD := 1 to FreqHandD[H,D] do 
begin
CreateTrace(D, H, Context, Y') ; 
for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
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8 := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, StartCalc,
EndCalc) ;
if 8 >= HCrit then (similarity of H and C exceeds HCrit) 
begin
{inc(N8um[NumD,NumH]);} (So MEAN similarity can
be calculated}
8 := Calc8im(NumD,NumH,Context, 1,EndCalc);
(Calculate D)
8um8im[NumD,NumH] := 8um8im[NumD,NumH] + 8; 
8umIntensity[NumD,NumH] := 
8umIntensity[NumD,NumH] + 8 * 8 * 8 ;  
end; 
if Debug then 
begin







p rocedure  DoHintzm an;
var
D,H, NumD, NumH, StartCalc, EndCalc, NumCon, LastCon, Slot 
byte;
FHandD, LastFreq: word;




if Context = Y' then 
begin 
EndCalc := 27;








StartCalc := 9; {Do similarity starting at slot 9 to get D vector 
only}
for NumCon := 0 to LastCon do 
for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
if NumCon = 0 then LastFreq := FreqHandD[H,D] 
else
LastFreq := NumExtras div (NumHyps * NumDs); {Note: a 
slight error may be introduced here because of integer division. Fix 
is to make sure (NumHyps * NumDs) is an exact mutiple of 
NumExtras.}
for FHandD := 1 to LastFreq do 
begin 
if NumCon = 0 then 
CreateTrace(D,H,Context,Y) 
else
CreateTrace(D,NumHyps,Context, 'N');{all non-exp 
contexts dumped H3}
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for NumD := 1 to NumDs do 
for NumH := 1 to NumHyps do 
begin
S := CalcSim(NumD,NumH, Context, StartCalc, 
EndCalc);{Eql}
8umSim[NumD,NumH] := SumSim[NumD,NumH] + S; 
Activation := S * 8 * S; {Equation 2} 
for Slot := 1 to EndCalc do 
B2choContent[NumD, NumH, Slot] := 
EchoContent[NumD, NumH, Slot]
+ Activation * TraceArr[Slot]; {Equation 4} 
if Debug then 
begin
writeln('D=',NumD:2, ' H=',NumH:2, ' S=',8:8:3); 
if lypeSim  = 'E' then 
begin
writeln('Preliminary E)cho Content calculations:'); 
for Slot := 1 to Endcalc do 
writeln('Slot=', Slot:3,' EcCon=', 
EchoContent[NumD, NumH, Slot]: 12:3,
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' Act=',Activation: 12:3, ' TrArr=', 







for H := 1 to NumHyps do 
for D := 1 to NumDs do 
begin
S := CalcEchoSim(D,H, Context, 1, 8);
SumSim[D,H] := SumSim[D,H] + 8;
SumIntensity[D,H] :=
SumIntensiiy[D,H] + 8 * 8 * 8 ;  
end; 
end;





case lypeSim  of
'F' : ID := Calc, on H mv., ignoring D. Can include context if 
specilied.';
B' : ID := CAlc. on H & D combined. Can include context if 
specified';
'L' : ID := 'Likelihood L(D |H) calculation. Does not do context.';
'?' : ID := 'Posterior L(H |D) calculation. Does not do context.';
'E' : ID := 'Hintzman' s echo content. Does context.';
'S' : ID := 'Hindsight routine, one probe: "What happened", Does 
context';
'X' : ID := 'Expertise routine. Diddles L(H | D) proc. Limited, 
requires stand, data input.';
'V : ID := 'Validity effect routine. Diddles L(H | D) proc.';
'C  : ID := 'Experimental Bayesian analog. Shows base rates. 
Uses context.';
H' : ID := Explores Hintzman' s suggestion involving echo 




begin {main block} 
clrscr;
randomize; {Should be called ONCE only at the beginning} 
if param count <>0 then lowvideo;
Title;
InitializeVariables; {Set variables to default values}
GetParams; {from hie on disk}




L := 1000 * L; {scale to range used by random}
ZeroSummaiy;
writeln;
writeln('Pressing any key except d aborts program. D key toggles 
debug.'); 
goto)qr( 1 ,wherey); 
for i := 1 to NumberReps do 
begin
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if keypressed then 
begin 
Ch := readkey;




if i mod 10 = 0 then write(i:4); 
gotoxy( 1, wherey) ;
BuildProbes; 









C  : DoConditional;
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H' : DoHintzman;




SaveParams; {to file on disk}
SaveData; {Save results to file Minerva3.dat} 










d) I don't know
2. How long is a regulation football?
a) 6 to 6 % inches
b) 11 to 11 16 inches
c) 48 inches exactly
d) I don't know
3. Which of the following will stop the game clock?
a) The player holding the ball is out of bounds
b) The ball changes possession from one team to the other
c) The offense achieves a hrst down
d) All of the above
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d) It depends on if yon are the offense or the defense











7. Which statem ent describes the tight end position?
a) The player in this position is a  combination of a lineman and 
a wide receiver.
b) A player who is lined up against the defense, and is closest 
to the ball before play begins.
c) This player is closest to the quarterback and either blocks 
incoming rushers or has the ball handed off to them.
d) I don't know
8. Which of the following will NOT stop a play?
a) when the bah carrier is grounded whether it be his own fault 
or a defender
b) when the ball carrier's feet touches the ground out of bounds
c) when a pass attem pt is completed
d) when a foul is called by a referee
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9. Before the two-minute warning, a time out lasts
___________; after the warning the time outs are only
long.
a) 2 minutes 30 seconds; 1 minute
b) 1 m inute 50 seconds; 40 seconds
c) 1 m inute 30 seconds; 30 seconds
d) 2 minutes; 2 minutes
10. Which of the following circumstances results in ONLY the 
loss of a down?
a) The ball was intentionally thrown backwards out of bounds
b) Forward pass touched by ineligible player in front of the 
neutral zone
c) Offensive pass interference
d) The ball was illegally handled when it was advanced
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11. All of the following violations receive a 5-yard penalty 
EXCEPT:
a) Substitution rules are violated
b) A player crawls
c) Players communicating with the coach during an illegal time
d) All of the above receive a 5-yard penalty
12. Which of the following violations receives a 15-yard penalty?
a) Hurdling occurs
b) A team illegally calls a  time out
c) A player is off sides
d) The ball is intentionally grounded
13. If a  kick off or punt enters the end zone and is not returned,
where does the opposing team get the bah?
a) 20 yard line
b) 50 yard line
c) From the point of the kick
d) 35 yard line
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14. How many offensive players m ust line up on the line of 
scrimmage?
a) at least 5
b) 7 o r more
c) 6 o r less
d) There is no specific number





d) there is no halo zone
16. Who is the head coach for OU? Offensive coordinator? 
Defensive coordinator?
a) Stoops; Leach; Stoops & Venables
b) Simmons; Stoops; Venables
c) Stoops; Jackson; McBrown
d) Simmons; McCown; Beasley
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17. Who did OU play last? What was the outcome?
a) Texas Tech; we lost
b) Iowa State University; we lost
c) TexasTech; we won
d) Iowa State University; we won


















Example of the efGect of probe speciGcity on a vector representation 
of memory. The left side of the graph represents the efGect of probing 
with a detailed probe (G = 1) and the right side represents probing 
memory with a less detailed probe (G = 0.5).
Less Detailed Probe
Detailed Probe
+1 —1 0 —1 0 +1 —1 —1 0
Event Vectors
LTM
+1 +1 0 -1 0 +1 - 1 0 0
+1 — 1 +1 — 1 0 +1 0 - 1 0
n - 1 0 +1 0 +1 - 1 —  1 0
+ 1 0 0 - 1 +1 +1 — 1 - 1 0
0 - 1 0 T“1 0 +1 - 1 - 1 +1
1F 1
Large Echo Intensity




The hindsight bias as simulated by MINERVA DM. In the graph, the 
upper line is the likelihood (echo intensity) for the outcome that 
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Example of a Vignette and Possible Outcomes. For each patient 
vignette there were two possible diagnoses. For each diagnosis both a
sketchy description and a detailed description were developed.






Summary of Possible Detail Level Scenario Pairings. Participants 





Actual Outcome. Likelihood judgments for the hindsight group were 
signi&cantly higher than the foresight group. Within the hindsight 
group, highly detailed outcome scenarios (HL, HH) were judged 
s ignificantly more likely than those with fewer details. There was no 














Alternative Outcome. The hindsight group made signiûcantly lower 
likelihood judgments than the foresight group. Within the hindsight 
group, the HL hindsight judgment was significantly lower them the 
other pairings. Finally, the LH judgment was not signiûcantly 
different from the foresight group, thus, indicating that no hindsight 













Frequency Data for the Hindsight Condition. The likelihood 
judgments were categorized by which outcome was judged to be most 
probable.






HL Alternative 16.75 1
Equal 7.26 3
Actual 89.60 90
HH Alternative 16.75 10
Equal 7.26 14
Actual 89.50 81
LL Alternative 16.76 21
Equal 7.26 12
Actual 89.60 77




Likelihood judgments hrom Experiment 1 (top paneD and MINERVA- 
DM estimates (bottom paneD. For both graphs, the upper line 
represents judgments for the actual outcome and the bottom line 






















G =0.4 G = 0.8
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Figure 7.
The simulated efkcts of time on the hindsight bias. Probability 
judgments are predicted become more extreme as the delay increases 











Differential Forgetting. There would be a d i^rence in the percentage 
of details remembered between the "actual" outcome scenarios, and the 
"alternative" outcomes over time.
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Example of Statements û-om the Memory Snbtest
Type of Statement Example
True favoring home 
team (THOME)
At the end of the hrst half, OSU 
threw a Hail Mary and OU 
intercepted it.
True favoring the 
opposition (TOPP)
During OU's Erst possession of the 
game, OSU recovered a fumbled ball.
False favoring home 
team (FHOME)
OU only punted one time during the 
entire game.
False favoring the 
opposition (FOPP)
Through out the game, OSU 

























Comparison of Mean Subtest Scores. A comparison of mean subtest 
scores for 2 day and 6-day hindsight groups for Experiment 2.
Subtest 2day 6 day
Overall M = 0.69 
SD = 0.01
M = 0.64 
SD = 0.006
True favoring home team 
(THOME)
M = 0.71 
SD = 0.21
M = 0.66 
SD = 0.08
True favoring the opposition 
(TOPP)
M = 0.71 
SD = 0.23
M = 0.51 
SD = 0.31
False favoring home team 
(FHOME)
M = 0.42 
SD = 0.19
M = 0.45 
SD = 0.17
False favoring the opposition 
(FOPP)
M = 0.77 
SD = 0.20




Difkrential forgetting. Memory for events that favored the Home 
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Seeing sports or game 
paraphernalia
T-shirts, sports signs, 
flags, etc.
Seeing home team 
athletes
Watching TV Broadcasts pertaining 




Passively listening to a 
discussion
Listening to other 
people, no participation
Active peirticipation in a 
discussion
NKK
Sport section of 
newspaper, magazines, 
websites, etc.
















Likelihood judgments 6-om Experiment 2 (top panel) and MINERVA- 
DM estimates (bottom pEineÜ.
Experiment 2
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